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Introduction 
As has recently been pointed out, stakeholder theory faces two closely related challenges in 
the light of globalization.1 On the one hand, globalization has not only led many firms to explore 
and expand into different parts of the world, it has also—and perhaps consequentially so—
created possibilities for non-traditional stakeholders to ‘knock on the doors’ of firms and make 
their concerns heard. On the other hand, the context of the multitude and complexity of novel 
stakeholder relationships that were not usually considered in stakeholder mappings renders the 
issue of corporate responsibility even more ‘political’2 than stakeholder relationships, at least in 
the context of specific issues, have always been.  
However, exactly how such non-traditional stakeholders knock on the firms’ doors has 
insufficiently been explored in stakeholder theorizing3, even though there are some studies that 
focus on the characteristics of firms associated with the likelihood of them becoming targets of 
stakeholder group mobilization.4 In a general sense, social movement studies have been 
suggested as providing useful concepts and theorizing for doing so.5 Here, we build on this 
suggestion, more specifically on Keck and Sikkink’s analysis of how transnational activist 
networks (TANs) are mobilized to remedy issues beyond the local situation where they occur.6 
Local issues become a cause for international mobilization when local protesters seek support 
from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and/or activist groups. Such has 
been recurrent in various industries, notably the international garment and electronics industries 
where production chains have been globalized.7 As firms in these and other industries have 
outsourced production to low-cost countries, concerns about the (lack of) regulation about the 
negative externalities associated with their production processes have also grown. Consequently, 
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stakeholder mobilization has sometimes been substantial, focusing on issues of environmental 
degradation, occupational safety, child labour, forced labour, sexual harassment, wage-rates, et 
cetera.8 Western firms have been challenged by Western stakeholder groups to improve their 
performance on these issues in their overseas production facilities.9 Yet, stakeholder theory 
appears to have difficulty in explaining the potential leverage that stakeholder groups without a 
clear and direct stake in a firm may exert over that particular firm.10 The model Keck and 
Sikkink proposed could offer a way to overcome this shortcoming. 
Although Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang model’ has originally been developed in the 
context of contentious politics—mobilization against state actors, as has traditionally been the 
focus of social movement scholars—the model can also productively be applied in the corporate 
context of ‘private politics’, conflict resolution without recourse to the state or legal 
procedures.11 Soule suggests that the separate study of contentious and private politics is an 
artifact of how research traditions in various fields have developed, and that in reality the two 
cannot really be separated.12 Following her, as well as building on our own observations in the 
study of transnational mobilization against corporations, we propose to speak of ‘boomerang 
politics’ as a general and overarching term in order to advance stakeholder theory in the light of 
the challenges from globalization by exploring how non-traditional stakeholders knock on firms’ 
doors.13  
In this chapter we will discuss the idea of boomerang politics and relate it to a less 
explored category of stakeholders, those without a clear and direct stake in a firm and the way 
they could exert influence over that particular firm. In the next section we will explore Keck and 
Sikkink’s boomerang model, expand it towards the area of private politics and illustrate it with 
some examples of what we refer to as ‘boomerang politics’. We will highlight some reflections 
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on the generalized model of boomerang politics and conclude our chapter with an indication of 
implications of this model for stakeholder theory, thus contributing to the objective of this 
volume.  
 
Boomerangs in contentious politics  
The boomerang model was developed in the 1990s by political scientists Keck and Sikkink 
in order to explain the mode of operating and success of what they called ‘transnational activist 
networks’ (TANs). They used this term to highlight “the structured and structuring dimension in 
the actions of these complex agents”.14 Others defined such networks as “a collaboration of 
movement organizations in at least two countries that exchange information and experiences, 
provide mutual support, have at least a partially organized social base, and engage in joint 
strategic campaigns”.15 The boomerang effect explained, among other things, leverage politics: 
“the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation, where weaker members of a 
network are unlikely to have influence”.16 Put shortly, the model thus makes clear how local 
protesters against a specific State A—the ultimate target—might be blocked, but still could be 
successful by mobilizing NGOs (international, or in State B) through transnational activist 
networks to stimulate State B—the primary target of the boomerang—to exert pressure on State 
A. When direct confrontation of the ultimate target is unproductive, some allies are sought that 
could pressure the primary target of the boomerang to compel the ultimate target to give in to 
demands. In Figure 1 this original boomerang model is depicted. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
The model has been applied or cited in many different studies17 in fields such as political 
science and sociology. Nevertheless, the model is of broader relevance than merely in its original 
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focus on contentious politics. As the potential leverage that the model demonstrates is made 
possible through increased levels of communication and information exchange and transnational 
solidarity, resulting in mobilization within Western countries to the support of affected parties in 
other countries, it can be extended beyond state politics. This we point out in the next section. 
 
Boomerangs in private politics  
McAteer and Pulver were among the first to acknowledge the wider relevance of the Keck 
and Sikkink model for the domain of private politics. They proposed a ‘corporate boomerang 
model’ to analyze international protest against multinational corporations.18 Their model builds 
on the use of shareholder activism by two different transnational activist networks (TANs) in 
their efforts to target oil companies. Both cases are set in the Ecuadorian part of the Amazon. In 
one case the TANs aimed to prevent Burlington Resources to initiate oil extraction in two 
concession blocks; in the other to force Chevron Corporation to remediate the environmental 
damage caused by its earlier operations. In both cases the protest focused on environmental 
issues and rights of indigenous people. The differences in outcome between the two cases are 
explained by variations in the cohesiveness of the respective TANs and by the relative 
vulnerability of the two corporate targets.  
The model of McAteer and Pulver is a valuable extension of the original boomerang model 
because it explicitly focuses on the role of private politics and illustrates how these politics differ 
from state-focused activism. However, the problem with this conception is that is does not cover 
all possible pathways the boomerang effect could follow. We therefore extend their model by 
presenting different scenarios of how the corporate sector might be brought into the boomerang 
model some further, or of how private politics might intermingle with, or substitute for, 
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contentious politics. To this end we explore the corporate boomerang effect from different angles 
to scrutinize its potential to understand the complex relationship between social movements, civil 
society, (multinational) corporations, and state institutions. In the next section we present three 
examples of boomerangs in which corporations are involved.  
 
Three examples 
In collaboration with various co-authors, we have been involved in empirical studies of 
interactions between activist groups and firms. Here, we summarize three of them: Gildan,19 
Nike,20 and multinationals in Burma/ IHC Caland,21 in order to present—in the next section—
some reflections on boomerang politics.22  
Gildan, Inc. Gildan is a Canadian producer of sports apparel. It is one of the many 
Western multinationals in the garment industry that was challenged by activist groups over 
labour conditions in their overseas production facilities. When Gildan set up production facilities 
in Honduras in 1998, it had already adopted a corporate code of conduct. Unlike in other cases, 
in which the production plant is a subsidiary of another multinational, often under Chinese or 
Korean ownership,23 the Honduras production facilities where under direct control by Gildan.  
In the course of 2001–2002, two organizations, the Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN) 
and the Honduran Independent Monitoring Team (EMIH) jointly investigated the investment 
strategy and labour practices of Gildan in Honduras, Mexico and El Salvador. MSN is a 
Canadian network that had been involved in campaigns against several transnational companies; 
EMIH is an organization defending women’s rights in the maquilas. Although Gildan claimed 
that working conditions in its factories were above local standards, a different picture was 
broadcasted on 22 January 2002, in the CBC television program Disclosure. It revealed a series 
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of abuses of workers’ rights in Gildan’s El Progreso factory in Honduras: excessively high 
production quotas, wages insufficient to cover even basic needs, remuneration based on 
productivity, supervised breaks, 11-hour work shifts, poor air quality in the workshops, wrongful 
dismissals, mandatory pre-employment pregnancy tests for women, and the dismissal of 
unionizing employees. MSN/EMIH demanded improvement of the working conditions whereas 
Gildan dismissed all allegations. The broadcasting transferred the conflict to Canada, and a 
campaign was born.  
The case developed in several rounds of interaction. Gildan made several moves over time 
in first adopting the WRAP standard (an industry-based certification scheme), then seeking 
accreditation from the well-known Bureau Veritas, subsequently endorsing the FLA standard (a 
multi-stakeholder standard believed by many to be more stringent than WRAP)24, then closing 
the plant, and finally reopening another plant while promising to preferentially hire workers from 
the previous plant. On their part, EMIH/MSN made clear that no progress was made, reiterated 
their claims and demands, expanded their network of support (Amnesty International, Oxfam, 
Solidarity Fund QFL—a socially responsible investment fund holding shares in Gildan), 
protested with FLA once Gildan was affiliated, and finally accepted a solution under tutelage of 
FLA although their preferred standard had been SA8000, an NGO standard deemed more 
stringent than FLA.  
The Gildan case is a clear example of a corporate boomerang (Figure 2). After all, El 
Progreso workers could not solve their complaints with the local management, and hence sought 
support with EMIH in Honduras, and through EMIH, with MSN in Canada, thus creating a 
transnational activist network. MSN organized and kept pressure on Gildan until, eventually, the 
conflict was resolved.  
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[Insert Figure 2] 
Two characteristics make the case interesting. First is the recourse to labour standards and 
other external certifications, both by Gildan and MSN. Seeking refuge to such external solutions 
apparently strengthens both actors’ position in their negotiation process, arguably in part by 
shifting the debate towards a discussion on the legitimacy of the external certification schemes 
rather than on what is actually being certified. The attention then focuses on the method of 
measurement instead of on what is being measured. Second is the observation of escalation in the 
conflict, prior to settlement, due to MSN expanding the network of supporters. Different modes 
of escalation are also observed in the next example. 
Nike, Reebok and adidas. Gildan is one of the many firms that were challenged for sub-
standard labour conditions in its overseas production facilities. Other firms, such as Nike, 
Reebok, and adidas, have experienced a wide variety of such challenges, relating to different 
production facilities in various countries. In each of these cases the protest model of the 
boomerang was similar, and need therefore not be repeated here. However, the recurrence of the 
protest led us to question whether and how such instances of protest might be related: do these 
protests have an impact on one another? Also, we were interested in gaining more insight in the 
patterning of protest tactics over time.  
In order to address these questions we selected eight cases of protest against Nike, adidas 
and Reebok in different countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, China and Pakistan) that were thoroughly 
analyzed and well covered in publicly available documents (mostly academic articles, teaching 
cases). Notably, the anti-sweatshop campaign started with a case of Nike in Indonesia, which we 
included in our selection of cases. We focused our analysis on the right-hand side of the 
boomerang: the tactics employed by the activist groups in the TAN toward the company. Earlier 
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on we presented a categorization of protest tactics, and argued that some tactics were only being 
used by activist groups when they felt that extra pressure was needed because of a lack of 
progress toward realizing their goals, i.e. escalation.25 Following this typology of tactics, we 
coded for the observed tactics in each of the selected cases. We observed that the tactics used at 
the start of some of the cases resembled a stage of escalation. Hence we concluded that in order 
to understand how the activist groups in the TAN operate in each of the cases, we need to 
consider the collection of cases together rather than examining the cases individually. 
We noticed escalation in corporate boomerangs along four dimensions. First in the choice 
of tactics: over time, as insufficient progress was made, activist groups would resort to tactics 
that make a larger impact on the targeted company. Second in the intensity of employing tactics: 
over time there was an increase of the number of protest tactics being employed until the case 
would be more or less resolved, or for cases in China until the activist groups considered that no 
further progress could be made. Third in the locus of protest: as little progress was made in the 
first case of Nike in Indonesia, protest was organized around allegations of sub-standard labour 
practices at other suppliers to Nike in different countries. Finally, the protest spread to targeting 
other firms in the industry, Reebok and adidas, as well as yet other firms. The latter two steps 
involve an upward ‘scale shift’, “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious 
actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and 
broadened claims”,26 in which the problem is redefined from a local mishap to one that is 
endemic for the industry. Hence, other elements of the corporate boomerang come into play here. 
Multinationals in Burma. The third example is of a slightly different nature as the 
ultimate target here is a state. The Burma regime is considered to be an oppressive military 
dictatorship where the military controls large parts of the economy. Repressed social and 
10 
 
political unrest in the late 1980s, and the rulers’ refusal to acknowledge the results of the 1990 
free elections were instrumental in the setting up of expatriate activist groups and networks 
campaigning for a ‘Free Burma’ in Western countries and Thailand. They argued that any 
foreign company setting up business in Burma needs to cooperate with the regime, and therefore 
these activists plead for a ban on novel, and the withdrawal of existing, investments by Western 
companies. The calls for boycott and disinvestment were endorsed by Aung San Suu Kyi, leader 
of the opposition and later winner of the Nobel Price for Peace. Many Western firms have hence 
experienced pressure to divest from the country. Consequently, many left the country, offering 
varying explanations, including protest threats, shifts in priorities, and damage to their corporate 
reputation.27 Levi-Strauss pointed out a moral argument, that doing business in Burma implies 
supporting the regime and hence its violations of human rights.  
Other firms resisted the increasing activist pressure. IHC Caland, a Dutch specialist 
supplier in the off-shore oil & gas industry, is one such company. It faced pressure when one of 
its subsidiaries in the Summer of 1998 gained a contract for a project in Burma’s territorial 
waters. The company refused to cancel the contract, providing various arguments, including: that 
the company would need the turn-over; that cancelling the contract would hurt the company’s 
reputation as a trustworthy partner; and that other firms would take over the contract so nothing 
would change in Burma anyway. It also argued that unlike in the USA, where President Clinton 
had imposed a ban on further investment in Burma, there was no legal obligation in the 
Netherlands to refrain from doing business in Burma.  
The Dutch Burma Coalition (BCN)—a pressure group set up by various development and 
environmental organizations and trade unions in order to coordinate the Burma campaign in the 
Netherland—staged protest events, for instance during and around the company’s annual 
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shareholder meetings, and mobilized public opinion, political parties, and some of the firm’s 
financers. It often did so in close collaboration with other organizations. Talks with the company 
were largely unproductive—actually, in 1999, the company accepted a second contract—but 
eventually, in 2003, IHC Caland’s new CEO declared that the company would not accept new 
contracts with Burma and in finalizing its current contracts would adhere to OECD guidelines.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Multinationals in Burma can also be understood from the perspective of a boomerang 
model (Figure 3, for the IHC Caland case), suggesting that States can be the ultimate targets of 
corporate boomerangs. In this example it is remarkable that there is no direct link between TAN 
and Burmese population although there is with their representatives in expatriate groups. A 
second point of interest is that when the activist coalition around BCN had difficulty in 
convincing the company to change its behaviour, it sought to enrol yet other actors, such as 
political parties and banks financing the corporation, in its campaign. A second-layer or nested 
boomerang was thus created, as is depicted in the right-hand side of Figure 3.  
 
Discussion 
As the examples have shown, boomerang models can be identified in both contentious 
politics and private politics, but as Soule suggests, the distinction is artificial. Nevertheless, in 
this chapter we applied this somewhat artificial distinction, if only because states can be the 
ultimate targets of boomerangs oriented toward corporations as is shown in the case of IHC 
Caland, and of Western multinationals in Burma more generally. Here, the ‘pressure path’ is 
largely similar to the divestment campaign against firms having made investments in South-
Africa during the Apartheid regime—morally legitimized by the Sullivan Principles, and 
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eventually supported by the USA government through legislation.28 Hence, the boomerang 
model is a broader phenomenon than is acknowledged in either the Keck and Sikkink or the 
McAteer and Pulver models. We therefore propose to refer to “boomerang politics” as a general 
model in which NGOs and/or activist groups, on behalf of affected parties, exert pressure on 
primary targets in order for them to influence the ultimate target.  
As shown in the examples, boomerang politics can be quite complex to unravel. They 
involve a dynamics of interaction, with parties acting and reacting to each other’s moves. 
Standards and certification schemes may be involved. Escalation may occur along various 
dimensions: in the number of allies, in the choice of tactics, and in the choice of where and when 
to challenge targets. A finally, boomerangs may become differentiated as a second layer of 
boomerang pressure is added to the primary target, as was the case in IHC Caland.  
Beyond these observations on the intricacies of particular cases—which we expect to 
reflect more generalized patterns though—some further reflections on the generalized model of 
boomerang politics are warranted. Below, we focus on the nature and relationship of the different 
targets involved, their sensitivity to pressure, and presence of intermittent organizations. These 
reflections provide an insight in who the targets are, why they are targeted, and how specific 
organizations can interfere in this process. We deliberately refrain from discussing the properties 
of the activists/NGOs because we focus on the specific tactic of boomerang politics, rather than 
on a broader overview of tactical choices such NGOs could make as discussed elsewhere in the 
literature.29 
Nature and relationship of primary and ultimate targets. Both ultimate and primary 
targets can be states or firms or, for that matter, any authority.30 We restrict our discussion here 
to states and firms. The situation in which both the primary and the ultimate targets are states is 
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covered in the Keck and Sikkink model; it is the domain of international politics from which this 
model emanates. Here, the starting point is most often to assert that states are autonomous 
entities that have a prolonged existence. Although all sorts of (international) treaties and policy 
documents exist that formally bind states, the accompanying reinforcement mechanisms are 
usually weak. Hence, there are no hierarchical relationships between states. States are 
autonomous entities but all sorts of resource dependencies may attenuate their room to 
manoeuvre, as we will discuss in the next section. 
However, the relationship between firms as primary and ultimate targets is quite different. 
As opposed to states, the long-term existence of firms is less certain as they may go bankrupt or 
cease to exist, for instance due to divestment. This is, in general, more likely to the ultimate 
targets as they are often (local) subcontractors or subsidiaries, than to primary targets who are 
more often multinational firms. The very existence of subsidiaries and subcontractors as ultimate 
targets might come to be at stake when the primary targets threaten to cease doing business with 
them. The threat is of course stronger to the extent that they are more dependent on a single 
client.  
This brings us to a second major difference: the existence of a contractual relationship 
between the primary and ultimate target. The production facility, the ultimate target, is either part 
of the corporate hierarchy as a subsidiary, or is bound to the focal firm via contractual 
obligations. In the latter case, the relationship may involve several steps and can be discontinued 
once a conflict with stakeholders arises, enabling the contracting firm to deny responsibility for, 
say, social conditions in their contractors’ production plants. This possibility of closedown and 
potential replacement of production facilities weakens the position of these local firms, as well as 
of local workers and the coherence of TANs, as employers may pit workers against each other.31 
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In such a situation, “gains made in one location may mean very real losses for workers 
elsewhere.”32 This possibility can be a threat to corporate boomerangs; activists’ efforts to 
improve for instance working conditions might result in worsening circumstances for local 
workers as they could be put out of work.33 Apparently the application of a corporate boomerang 
involves a careful balancing act, which might weaken its effectiveness and its attractiveness to 
activists.  
Finally, whereas relations between states usually are permanent in nature, relations 
between firms are more temporal, or at least easier to sever. Of course, these relations are 
covered in contracts but a subcontracting firm may have contractual obligations to multiple firms 
which might mean that they are less dependent on one single firm.  
Challenging states as ultimate targets through firms as primary targets—the situation in 
Burma—combines some of the above difficulties. After all, the very reason for which states 
might be challenged as ultimate targets is arguably related to the lack of a well-functioning 
pluralistic and democratic system, which would otherwise provide entry points for conflict 
resolution. Further, in the contractual relationship between the state as ultimate target and the 
firm as primary target, the balance of power is in most cases likely to lean toward the state. The 
state has concessions to sell and orders to grant, whereas the firm faces competition; other firms 
might step in and take the order, as the IHC Caland example illustrated. 
Sensitivity to pressure. Another important element in the comparison between state-
focused and corporate boomerangs involves the differences in vulnerability of the respective 
targets. What makes a state or a firm sensitive to pressure?  
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The responsiveness of states as primary targets is relatively well understood—it is the 
domain of most of the social movement literature—and can be said to depend on the functioning 
of a pluralistic and democratic system.34  
To exert influence over states as ultimate targets is more difficult, and likely to be related 
to resource dependencies as addressed in resource-dependence theory in organization studies.35 
For example, states can be dependent on other states or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
for financial or military resources. Think of loans (either direct from other states, or through 
international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, or 
regional development banks), development aid (financial or material, from other states, through 
UN agencies such as FAO, WHO, or from relief NGOs), or defence capacity (delivery of 
equipment, training of forces, inclusion in security programs either bilaterally or through IGOs 
such as NATO). Such dependencies create power differences that can be used to exert leverage 
over the dependent party. Because of the autonomy of states, the possibility to opt for autarky 
(such as North Korea or Burma), or the presence of oppressive regimes, such resource 
dependencies need not always exist, or can turn out to be ineffective. Still, in many situations 
examples of such dependencies between states can be found.  
Legitimacy is an important element in these discussions about sensitivity to external 
pressure.36 To the extent that governments want to be perceived as legitimate (e.g., by being 
democracies, or by being members in good standing of IGOs such as OECD, ILO or other UN 
agencies), different types of pressure can be exerted upon them. In institutional theory often a 
distinction is made between cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that bring 
stability to social life.37 Regulative elements often involve the force of law; cultural-cognitive 
elements are related to normative ideas about what constitutes moral legitimacy, to adhere to 
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specific norms; and cultural-cognitive elements relate to what is perceived to be an entity in good 
standing. Obviously, the three elements are interrelated, and certainly not universal. For 
example, calling upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be less effective in some 
Asian states or regarding Asian companies, as the very notion of Human Rights is contested 
across different cultures.38 For coercive elements to be effective a government needs to accept 
the jurisdiction of international treaties, i.e. to acknowledge the underlying norms that are 
expressed in such treaties; only then can they be brought to the associated courts (think of 
International Court of Justice, European Council of Human Rights or the European Court).  
The vulnerability of firms as ultimate targets is implied in the contractual relationship with 
the firm(s) for which it produces. Michael Porter’s framework nicely captures the dynamics of 
the relationship in case the ultimate target is in a supply relationship, rather than part of the 
corporate hierarchy of the primary target.39  
Resource dependencies and legitimacy provide levers on firms as primary targets. Next to 
regulatory coercive pressure, several tactics can be applied to exert normative pressure.40 
Examples include: (1) different forms of corporate governance, such as shareholder activism on 
social issues or socially responsible investments; (2) attempts to influence operational costs and 
benefits, either in the marketplace or in public opinion (through a reputation effect); and (3) 
through social alliances in which issues of corporate social responsibility can be influential. The 
sensitivity to such pressure will vary across different industries and across different countries but 
a combination of such tactics is likely to be applied by NGOs to invoke change at the level of the 
ultimate target.41 The availability and nature of intermittent organizations is another element that 
is likely to influence the pressure paths. 
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Presence of intermittent organizations. Intermittent organizations can be important in 
boomerang politics. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations, World 
Trade Organization, International Labour Organization or the European Union, have a normative 
role, among other roles, in keeping up standards among their members. It is on this ground that 
they may have influence over State A, as it allows for symbolic pressure, and sometimes may 
legitimate coercive power. Thus, in Figure 4, IGOs may be approached by NGOs to pressurize 
State B to pressurize State A, or, NGOs and State B might seek to convince IGOs to pressurize 
State A. Sometimes NGOs may have also an observer status to these intergovernmental 
organizations and of course both firms and NGOs try to influence decision-making processes 
within these organizations, for instance via lobbying. IGOs make predominantly use of symbolic 
politics (exerting political pressure) and leverage politics (imposing sanctions). 
[Insert Figure 4] 
Firms on the other hand may be adherents to multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) which 
typically are independent from states, and in which NGOs may have a much larger say. In some 
cases NGOs are (co-)founders of multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the Fair Labor 
Association or Social Accountability International, whereas in other cases they are partners in 
IGO initiatives, such as the UN Global Compact.42 These MSIs predominantly make use of 
accountability politics such as certification or external verification. It should be noted that often 
Western firms are members of these MSIs, whereas their contract partners are typically not: this 
might be caused by a mix of higher vulnerability (reputation risks), slack resources or a stronger 
presence of NGOs in their immediate environment. Overall, the effectiveness of intermittent 
organizations is regularly debated but this regards both the state-focused and the corporate-
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focused ones.43 With the increasing focus on private politics, their role nevertheless seems to 
become more and more important. 
 
Implications for stakeholder theory 
Having explored the notion of boomerang politics in some detail, we will now explore how 
this notion could contribute to stakeholder theory. In a recent review essay, De Bakker and Den 
Hond argued that the question of stakeholder influence over firms is a challenging one as activist 
groups are often considered as secondary stakeholders in the stakeholder literature.44 Secondary 
stakeholders “are diverse and include those who are not directly engaged in the organization’s 
economic activities but are able to exert influence or are affected by the organization”45. As these 
stakeholders do not have a formal contractual bond with the firm and also lack direct legal 
authority over the firm, their position opposite firms is weaker and their salience often is 
considered to be relatively low. Being seen as less salient, for long they have received less 
attention in the literature but this is changing as the role of NGOs in impacting firms is receiving 
more and more research attention.46 As Frooman already noted, these stakeholders may find 
indirect ways to develop power and legitimacy and thus enter the picture, working though 
allies.47 As stakeholders, either primary or secondary, cooperate to get their claims attended to, 
they engage in collective action. They need each other to establish their objectives and they 
could build on each others’ activities. To this end, it seems helpful not to view salience as a fixed 
attribute but as one that depends on the interaction between one or more stakeholder groups, the 
claim at hand and the firm to which it is addressed.48 Boomerang politics can be helpful in 
understanding the pathways by which stakeholder groups that have for long been seen as more 
marginal can still be effective in the “politics of stakeholder influence”.49  
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Stakeholders often do not operate in isolation. This is exactly where stakeholder theory 
could learn from social movement studies, as dealing with problems of collective action, allies 
and adversaries has been a central element of that branch of sociology. From a social movement 
studies’ perspective, Whittier discusses various consequences that heterogeneity within a 
movement may have on that particular movement.50 For example, it may result in the generation 
of new stakeholder groups that work on other themes, it may have spill-over effects in the sense 
that stakeholder groups learn from each other in how to target firms effectively, or it may have 
consequences for their ability to change firm behaviour.  
Such heterogeneity may also be at stake within the TANs that apply boomerang politics. 
There may also be differences in interest, identity, and ideology of local NGOs versus their 
international allies. According to McAteer and Pulver, a TAN can be seen as “an arena of 
convergence between widely different actors separated by cultural differences, geographic 
location, and access to resources”.51 These differences can be large, for instance on issues like 
power, culture, ideology or strategic interests.52 The ways in which these transnational networks 
are able to cope with these differences in interests, identities and ideologies among their local 
member organizations will be important in the degree to which they can effectively exert 
pressure on corporations or states in both countries.  
Although lessons might thus be learned from combining stakeholder theory and social 
movement studies, research combining both streams of literature is still relatively scarce. This 
might be caused by the different dominant foci of both domains: stakeholder theory traditionally 
considered (firm) management and stems from management studies, whereas social movement 
studies emphasized governments and society at large and stems from sociology. Interesting 
attempts to overcome this distinction between both approaches can be found in studies that focus 
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on issues or issue domains. In such research on collaboration53 stakeholders’ issues have 
received quite some attention; increasingly concepts from social movement studies, such as 
mobilization and opportunity structures, are incorporated in such analyses54, for instance 
focussing on the formation of cross-sector social partnerships to deal with an issue. The current 
chapter, in which we combine several theoretical insights to understand a specific tactic, 
underscores the relevance of widening the scope of stakeholder theorizing—an important 
objective of this volume. 
The stark analytic divide between collaboration and conflict that we applied in this 
chapter mainly served to outline the various positions actors in these boomerang politics can 
take. Although conflicts often are important in boomerang politics, the role of conflict should not 
be over-estimated. The distinction between contentious and private politics is sometimes 
misguiding55 in the sense that contentious and private politics in many cases are complementary. 
One can however expect that such interaction patterns will often be mixed and that next to 
conflict collaboration also can occur. It would be helpful to concentrate on interaction processes 
over time, including both collaboration and conflict to understand the evolution of transnational 
stakeholder influence over time.56 After all, if firms and states differ in the factors that affect 
their interests and reputations, as well as in the type of relationships they entertain with other 
actors, there might be some patterning in the evolution of protest (such as the sequencing of 
protest strategies), or there might appear more or less effective or viable combinations of 
strategies like the simultaneous pursuit of both scale shift and insider tactics.  
 
Concluding remarks 
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In this chapter we discussed a specific application of stakeholder theory, thereby 
contributing to the objective of this edited volume to provide a multi-faceted understanding of 
corporate social responsibility among different stakeholders and the pressures and conflicts that 
result from them. We present the notion of boomerang politics as a means to understand 
transnational stakeholder influence in the context of globalization. This notion generalizes Keck 
and Sikkink’s state-focused boomerang model by including private politics, and thus making it 
relevant for stakeholder theorizing. As opposed to states, firms provide different leverage points 
for transnational stakeholder influence. Their commercial objectives make them more vulnerable 
for reputational damage, their contractual bonds provide them with different influence pathways 
opposite subsidiaries, and their stakeholders’ calls for accountability require them to inform 
different audiences of their activities. All these characteristics provide a potential for boomerang 
politics. Taking these more complex pressure paths into account seems useful when trying to 
understand the ways secondary stakeholders try to impact their ultimate targets. 
Yet, more work remains to be done to unravel these boomerang politics, both theoretical 
and empirical. First, following the combination of theoretical perspectives selected in this 
chapter, the links between stakeholder management and social movement studies could be 
explored further, for instance on issues like scale shift or transnational activism in a wider 
sense.57 By contrasting state-focused and corporate boomerangs, we provide some angles for 
further empirical work on the links between social movements and corporations but we also call 
for a deeper examination. The growing literature on cooperation and focusing on issues or fields 
seem to offer valuable approaches to guide such empirical research. How are issues resolved? 
How are norms formed and transferred across fields? Detailed empirical work could help to paint 
a more nuanced picture of boomerang politics. 
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In addition, in this chapter we more or less neglected the variety in actors operating 
within TANs because we aimed to highlight the mechanisms at work in boomerang politics. 
Indeed, if one thing becomes clear in discussing boomerang politics then it would be the variety 
of actors involved in these interaction processes and, therefore, the variety of different angles 
available to address this phenomenon. Tarrow, for instance, emphasized the domestic 
embeddedness of network members and the political opportunities that arise to shift scales.58 In a 
case study of Oxfam researchers indeed claim that “existing scholarship has insufficiently 
identified the local or parochial nature of the identities of global civil society actors”59. Other 
researchers do not focus on local protest movements in target countries; and yet others only 
consider such local movements or only focus on protest without examining other tactics such as 
framing or media use. Within empirical analyses of boomerang politics, is will be useful to 
investigate both TANSs as a whole and the roles of individual organizations within them. When 
exactly do TANs opt for boomerang politics? What are the internal dynamics involved? And 
how to these dynamics develop over time? The examples provided in this chapter are based on a 
few studies that aimed to uncover parts of these processes but more detailed information is 
needed.  
Finally, it is important to note that in studying contentious and private politics the focus 
of analysis is often on the social movement, or maybe on the transnational stakeholder, thereby 
disregarding the responses by target firms and the way they connect, or not, to state policies. 
Corporate political activity60 on issues like transnational activism is another area that should 
receive more attention. As Boris Holzer suggests, the lack of global enforcement of rules and 
standards makes these private politics, including corporate boomerangs, “indispensable to hold 
otherwise unfettered economic power in check”.61 The mechanisms outlined in this chapter 
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provide some ways for transnational stakeholders to build or maintain such a system of checks 
and balances. 
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Figure 1: The boomerang effect (adapted from Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Arrows indicate flows of 
information exchange, support, or pressure. 
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Figure 2: The Gildan case in a boomerang model. 
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Figure 3: The IHC Caland case in a boomerang model. 
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Figure 4: Intermittent organizations in boomerang politics.  
 
 
 
